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PUBLIC LAND & RESOURCES LAW REVIEW
"The days have ended when the forest may be viewed only
as trees and trees viewed only as timber. The soil and the
water, the grasses and the shrubs, the fish and the wildlife,
and the beauty that is the forest must become integral parts
of resource managers' thinking and actions."
2
- Minnesota Senator Hubert Humphrey
I. INTRODUCTION
National Forests comprise eight and one half percent of the total land in
the United States. Our National Forests are ecological reserves held by the
public in order to provide wildlife habitat, clean water, and opportunities
for recreation and natural resource extraction. 3 National Forests are man-
aged by the United States Forest Service ("FS"), a federal administrative
agency that is a branch of the United States Department of Agriculture.4
Federal administrative agencies derive their power to regulate from the ex-
ecutive branch of government, which delegates authority to them. Admin-
istrative agencies such as the FS generally exercise all three of the powers
usually divided among the three branches of federal government: legisla-
tive, executive, and judicial.5 Thus, the FS has the power to promulgate its
own regulations, enforce its own mandates and laws, and adjudicate appeals
of its own decisions.
Administrative agencies like the FS are inherently biased toward approv-
ing their own decisions, because they make their own rules, enforce their
own rules, and then adjudicate disputes over their own actions. Moreover,
as an administrative agency the FS is "not directly accountable to the peo-
ple.",6 As founding father James Madison stated, "[t]he accumulation of all
powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands.. .may justly
be pronounced the very definition of tyranny. "0
Because of the lack of direct public accountability, citizen-initiated law-
suits against the FS are currently a critical tool allowing citizens to ensure
that ecologically valid science, not administrative fiat, is governing deci-
sions of the FS. Despite the fact that the FS's primary function since its
inception has been to provide the logging industry with timber,8 public
opinion now recognizes that National Forests are valuable for collective
2. Seattle Audubon Socy. v. Evans, 771 F. Supp. 1081, 1088-89 (W.D. Wash. 1991) (citing 122
Cong. Rec. 5619 (daily ed. Mar. 5, 1976)).
3. United States Forest Service, About Us- Meet the Forest Service,
http://www.fs.fed.us/aboutus/meetfs (accessed March 29, 2006).
4. United States Forest Service, Welcome, http://www.fs.fed.us (accessed March 31, 2006).
5. Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law 292-293 (2d ed., Aspen Publishers 2005).
6. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Resources Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984).
7. Chemerinsky, supra n. 5, at 293 (citing The Federalist No. 47, p.3 0 1 (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961)).
8. Jack Tuholske & Beth Brennan, The National Forest Management Act: Judicial Interpretation
of a Substantive Environmental Statute, 15 Pub. Land L. Rev. 53, 57-58 (1994).
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ecological, recreational, aesthetic, and spiritual interests, and are not simply
a resource to be exploited for the short-term profit of a few extractive in-
dustries.9 Many citizens do not want the FS to continue to manage National
Forests simply as tree farms, but rather as complex ecological systems. To
that end, citizen groups have pursued lawsuits against the FS as one avenue
to ensure that national forests are properly managed in view of their com-
plex ecological character. 10
Case law does not mandate that a reviewing court must give blind defer-
ence to decisions of administrative agencies." To do so would in effect
eliminate any reason for judicial review at all. On the contrary, in the con-
text of FS management, Congress specifically wanted the FS to have lim-
ited discretion and enacted statutory law to ensure that FS discretion was
checked.12 In part, these laws encourage reviewing courts to scrutinize an
agency's scientific methodology in order to ensure that it is in compliance
with substantive scientific mandates. 13  Nonetheless, courts have histori-
cally been reluctant to overrule an agency's "scientific" decisions because
the science is bad; 14 especially in instances where the courts only superfi-
cially apply the "arbitrary and capricious" standard of review of the Admin-
istrative Procedures Act.'
5
9. National Forest Protection Alliance, Forest Values, http://www.forestadvocate.org/values
index.html (accessed March 31, 2006).
10. Earth Island v. U.S. Forest Service, 442 F.3d 1147, 1177 (9th Cir. 2006) (noting "a disturbing
trend in the USFS's recent timber-harvesting and timber-sale activities" and listing a number of cases
brought by citizen groups where the FS's timber sales were overtumed for violating environmental
laws). [hereinafter Earth Island 11]
11. lnfra Section V-A-1.
12. Infra Section 1-A.
13. National Forest Management Act of 1976, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600 et seq. (2000); National Envi-
ronmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 et seq. (2000); 40 C.F.R. § 1502.24 (2006).
14. See e.g. Inland Empire Public Lands Council v. U.S. Forest Service, 88 F.3d 754, 760-63 (9th
Cir. 1996); see also Environmental Protection Information Center v. U.S. Forest Service, 451 F.3d
1005, 1014 (9th Cir. 2006) (impliedly affirming Inland Empire blind deference to the Forest Services'
cumulative impacts model).
15. Factual disputes over Forest Service management decisions that implicate agency expertise are
reviewed under the deferential standards set forth in the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), which
states in part that the reviewing court shall "hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and
conclusions found to be (A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with law" or "(D) without observance of procedure required by law ...." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2000);
Idaho Sporting Cong., Inc. v. Rittenhouse, 305 F.3d 957, 964 (9th Cir. 2002). A decision is arbitrary
and capricious if the agency "relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely
failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs
counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a differ-
ence in view or the product of agency expertise," Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983), orif there has been a clear error of judgment. Marsh v. Oregon Nat.
Resources Council, 490 U.S. 360, 375 (1989). The reviewing court's inquiry into the agency record
must be searching and careful, Id. at 378, and the agency's findings must support its decision, and those
findings must be supported by substantial evidence - there must be a rational connection between the
facts found and the choices made. Burlington Truck Lines. v. United States, 83 S. Ct. 239, 245-246
(1962). Despite the fact that the APA review standard requires a searching inquiry, courts will some-
times perform only a cursory review of the agency's science and proclaim that the decision was not
arbitrary. See Inland Empire, 88 F.3d at 760-763.
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While some Courts still harbor reluctance to overrule scientific deci-
sions, 16 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has been more willing lately to
scrutinize FS scientific methodology to ensure compliance with law. 17 This
trend in the Ninth Circuit is important, because of the 155 National Forests
in the country, almost one-half of them are located in the geographic area
within the Ninth Circuit's jurisdiction. 18 Lands Council v. Powell is a piv-
otal case in the trend away from blind deference to FS scientific methods. 19
In Lands Council, the Court thoroughly scrutinized the FS's scientific data
and methods, and overturned several of the FS's conclusions. More impor-
tantly, the Court announced that the FS's scientific model must meet a stan-
dard of "required reliability" in order for projections based upon that model
to be upheld as good science.20  Case law, regulatory mandates, and his-
torical context, as well as acceptance by subsequent courts, support the
Court's holding that the FS must demonstrate the reliability of its scientific
methodology. However, the Court should have articulated a clearer stan-
dard for future courts to utilize when determining whether or not the FS's
science is reliable.
Section II of this article will examine the context of Lands Council on the
issue of reliability of the FS's scientific methodology. It will provide an
overview of the history of FS management of National Forests, and the role
which Congress has played in guiding that management. It will then dis-
cuss changes in the case law regarding judicial deference to the FS's scien-
tific methodology. The article will then briefly discuss the current post
Lands Council state of case law, and reasons that further change is required.
Section Il of the article will discuss Lands Council in detail. It will state
the relevant facts, procedural history, and the holding and reasoning appli-
cable to this article. Section IV will discuss the issues. It will examine
whether the case law, regulations, and historical context supported the
Court's decision. It will also examine whether the Court's reasoning and
holding has been followed in subsequent decisions. It will then discuss the
need for a clear standard for "methodology review" by the courts, and will
suggest for such a standard.
16. See Ecology Center v. Austin, 430 F.3d 1057, 1071-1078 (9th Cir. 2005) (McKeown, M.,
dissenting), cert denied, 2007 WL 36032.
17. Ecology Center, 430 F.3d at 1061-1071; Earth Island 11, 442 F.3d at 1159-1176.
18. United States Forest Service, History, http://www.fs.fed.us/aboutus/history (accessed March
29, 2006); United States Forest Service, Recreational Activities: Find a Forest by State,
http://www.fs.fed.us/recreation/map/statejlist (accessed March 29, 2006); 28 U.S.C. § 41 (2000).
19. Lands Council v. Powell, 379 F.3d 738 (9th Cir. 2004), superceded, 395 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir.
2005).
20. Id. at 1035.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. History of National Forest Management
Congress originally laid the foundation for the National Forest system in
1891 with the passage of the Forest Reserve (Creative) Act ("Creative
Act"), which authorized the creation of public forest reserves. This act
was one of the country's first steps toward preservation of forest lands, and
was mostly a response to the unregulated logging that was deforesting most
22
of the eastern United States and causing large-scale flooding and erosion.
Congress followed the Creative Act with the 1897 Organic Administrative
Act ("Organic Act"). 23 The Organic Act appropriated funds for forest man-
agement and provided vague guidance that the forest reserves should be
managed primarily for timber production and water control.24 When Theo-
dore Roosevelt became President at the turn of the century, he expanded
upon the foundation laid by the Organic and Creative Acts and elevated the
Forest Service to the level of a formal federal agency. 25  Roosevelt ex-
panded the National Forest lands to encompass 132 million acres and ap-
pointed Gifford Pinchot as the head of the agency.26 The FS coordinated
fire fighting, established tree nurseries, and distributed seedlings for refor-
estation. During the Dust Bowl era the FS helped control erosion, and dur-
ing the Great Depression the FS administered the Civilian Conservation
Corps and the Works Progress Administration.27 But after World War II
the goals of the FS changed to support the booming demand for wood
products and the industrial method of tree-farming.28
The increase in industrial logging methods such as clearcutting and in-
tensive road-building eventually prompted Congress to pass the Multiple-
Use Sustained Yield Act ("MUSYA") in 1960.29 MUYSA purported to
broaden the goals of National Forest management by including the protec-
tion of recreation, wildlife, fish, and range resources as "equally important"
as the goals of timber production and water control.3° In effect, MUYSA
21. Tuholske & Brennan, supra n. 8, at 57 (citing Act of March 6, 1891, 26 Stat. 1103, repealed by
90 Stat. 2792 (1976)).
22. National Forest Protection Alliance, Looking Back at Our National Forests,
http://www.forestadvocate.org/century/usfs.html (accessed March 29, 2006); Tuholske & Brennan,
supra n. 8, at 57 (citing David A. Clary, Timber and the Forest Service 3, 14 (1986)).
23. Tuholske & Brennan, supra n. 8, at 57, (citing 16 U.S.C. §§ 473-481 (repealed in part)).
24. Kristen Potter, Judicial Review of Forest Service Decisions Made Pursuant to the National
Forest Management Act's Substantive Requirements: Time for a Science Court? 20 J. Nat'l A. Admin. L.
Judges 241, 243 (2000); Tuholske & Brennan, supra n. 8, at 57 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 475,477 (2000)).
25. Tuholske & Brennan, supra n. 8, at 57-58 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 472 (2000)); Looking Back at
Our National Forests, supra n. 22.
26. Id.
27. Looking Back at Our National Forests, supra n. 22.
28. Tuholske & Brennan, supra n. 8, at 57; Looking Back at Our National Forests, supra n. 22.
29. ld; 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-531 (2000).
30. Potter, supra n. 24, at 243; Tuholske & Brennan, supra n. 8, at 59 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 528).
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did not deflect the agency's focus on industrial logging, and the FS contin-
ued to unsustainably and detrimentally log the National Forests.31
Throughout the 1960's the public began to loudly decry the FS's unsus-
tainable practices. In 1970, Arnold Bolle, then-Dean of the University of
Montana School of Forestry published the Bolle Report, which criticized
the FS's method and level of timber extraction on the National Forests, spe-
cifically clearcutting, on the ground that MUYSA mandated that wildlife,
recreation, fish, and range resources must also be considered in the man-
agement decisions of National Forests.32 Following the Bolle Report, the
U.S. Senate held the 1972 Church Hearings which resulted in Senate-
proposed limitations on logging in the National Forests, known as the
Church Guidelines.33 Despite these guidelines, clearcutting continued, and
in the early 1970's a flood from a clearcut on the Monongahela National
Forest in West Virginia wiped out a Senator's hometown. Citizens sued and
the 4th Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Organic Act prohibited clear-
cuts in National Forests.34
Congress responded to the Church Guidelines and the Monongahela case
by enacting the National Forest Management Act ("NFMA") in 1976.35
NFMA created procedural and substantive mandates for the FS's manage-
ment of the National Forests. 36 The provisions of NFMA limit the discre-
tion of the FS and give the courts standards to review FS management deci-
sions to make sure they are ensuring multiple uses, and not simply perpetu-
ating timber extraction at the costs of all other interests.37 Among other
mandates, NFMA requires the FS to provide for the diversity of animal and
plant communities and ensure that management activities do not irreversi-
bly damage soils. 38  While NFMA remains deferential to the FS in that it
gives the FS discretion on how to carry out specific decisions, NFMA has
been described as "the most adventurous congressional incursion into the
on-the-ground activities of the United States Forest Service.
3 9
31. Potter, supra n. 24, at 243, 244; Tuholske & Brennan, supra n.8, at 60 (citing generally Clary,
supra n. 22, at 156-165).
32. Tuholske & Brennan, supra n. 8, at 61-62 (citing United States Forest Service, Management
Practices on the Bitterroot: A Task Force Appraisal, Files 1500, 2470 (May 1969 - April 1970) (avail-
able from the Forest Service Region One office, Missoula, Montana).
33. Tuholske & Brennan, supra n. 8, at 62.
34. W. Virginia Div. of the !zaak Walton League of Am. v. Butz, 367 F.Supp. 422 (D.W.Va. 1973),
aftid, 522 F.2d 945 (4th Cir. 1975); Potter, supra n. 24, at 243-245; Looking Back at Our National
Forests, supra n. 22.
35. National Forest Management Act of 1976, 16 U.S.C. § 1600 et seq. (2000); Tuholske & Bren-
nan, supra n. 8, at 64.
36. 16 U.S.C. § 1604.
37. Potter, supra n. 24, at 243-244; 16 U.S.C. § 1604 et seq.
38. 16 USC § 1604(g)(3)(B); 16 U.S.C. § 1604 (g)(3)(E)(i).
39. Potter, supra n. 24, at 245-247 (citing Charles T. Wilkinson & H. Michael Anderson, Land and
Resource Planning in the National Forests, 64 Or. L. Rev. 1 (1985), reprinted as Charles T. Wilkinson
& H. Michael Anderson, Land and Resource Planning in the National Forests (1987)).
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Along with NFMA's mandates, the procedural mandates of the National
Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA")J also apply to FS timber sale deci-
sions.4' Congress passed NEPA to protect the environment by ensuring that
federal agencies carefully weigh the environmental impact of their deci-
sions before undertaking major actions. 42 NEPA requires that federal agen-
cies take a "hard look" at the potential environmental impacts of their pro-
posed actions by composing a detailed Environmental Impact Statement
("EIS") for all "major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of
the human environment., 43 The "hard look" is required by NEPA to ensure
the agency has detailed information about significant environmental im-
pacts before it makes a decision, and to ensure that the information is avail-
able to the public.44 NEPA does not mandate a particular substantive result,
but instead mandates a process.
45
B. Changes in Judicial Review of Scientific Methodology
1. Inland Empire Public Lands Council v. U.S. Forest Service
Although Congressional intent behind the passage of NFMA was to limit
FS discretion, in light of the FS's historical mismanagement of National
Forests, the Ninth Circuit initially chose to continue blindly deferring to
Forest Service discretion. Inland Empire Public Lands Council v. U.S.
Forest Service is an oft-cited example of judicial deference given to the FS
when plaintiffs raise questions over the adequacy of the FS's scientific
methodology.46 In Inland Empire, Plaintiffs asserted that the FS of the
Kootenai National Forest ("KNF") in Montana had violated NFMA because
it had never examined actual population size, population trends, or opportu-
nities for species interaction in order to ensure the viability of seven sensi-
tive species residing in an area slated for logging. Instead the FS had cre-
ated a model which estimated how many acres of habitat an individual spe-
cies needed, and then applied the model to the Forest and concluded that
there was enough habitat for all the species (the "habitat-proxy" method).
Additionally, Plaintiffs asserted that the FS had violated NFMA by failing
to monitor population trends of the KNF's management indicator species
("MIS") for old-growth dependent species (i.e. the pileated woodpecker).
Here again, the FS had done no actual monitoring of the species. Instead,
the FS simply estimated the amount of habitat which would be destroyed by
40. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4361 (2000).
41. See e.g. Lands Council, 395 F.3d, at 1026-1027.
42. Lands Council, 395 F.3d at 1026.
43. Rittenhouse, 305 F.3d at 963 (internal citation omitted).
44. Neighbors of Cuddy Mt. v. Alexander, 303 F.3d 1059, 1063 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Robertson v.
Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 349 (1989)).
45. Neighbors, 303 F.3d at 1063 (citations omitted).
46. Inland Empire, 88 F.3d 754.
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the timber sale to predict the effect on the MIS and the species it repre-
sented (the "proxy-on-proxy" method).47
The district court dismissed Plaintiffs' complaints as simply "quibbling"
over scientific methodologies, and stated that a reviewing court should de-
fer to the FS's choice of scientific methodologies.48 On appeal, the Ninth
Circuit recognized that NFMA imposed a substantive duty upon the FS to
"provide for diversity of plant and animal communities. '" 49 The Court rec-
ognized that NFMA's applicable implementing regulations required "viable
populations" of species, and that viable populations were those which have
"estimated numbers and distribution of reproductive individuals to insure its
continued existence is well distributed in the planning area. 50  The Court
also recognized that the regulations required that "habitat must be provided
to support, at least, a minimum number of reproductive individuals and that
habitat must be well distributed so that those individuals can interact with
others in the planning area."''0 Regarding the sensitive species claim, the
Court further recognized that the FS's obligation to maintain species viabil-
ity applies with "special force" to sensitive species.52
Despite its conclusions, the Court stated that the "Service's methodology
reasonably ensures such populations [of sensitive species] by requiring that
the decision area contain enough of the types of habitat essential for sur-
vival. '53 The Court did not scrutinize the FS's habitat modeling methodol-
ogy, neither in terms of how habitat was actually inventoried, nor how the
percentages of necessary habitat had been created. Additionally, assuming
the model could accurately predict habitat needs, the court did not discuss
how it was possible to ensure viability if the FS had no idea of the actual
number of species in the project area.
Regarding the MIS claim, the court again deferred to the FS's decision
not to monitor populations, despite the specific regulation language requir-
ing "population trends of the management indicator species [to] be moni-
tored and relationships to habitat determined. ' 54 The reasoning for this
deference seemed to be simply that because the FS had reached a conclu-
sion regarding population predictions, they had complied with NFMA. 5 Or
perhaps the reason for the deference was the Court's statement, embedded
in a footnote, was that the FS had stated there is no "technically reliable and
cost-effective method of counting individual members of the species., 56
47. Inland Empire at 762-763.
48. Id. at 758.
49. Id. at 759 (citing 16 U.S.C § 1604(g)(3)(B) (1996)).
50. Id. at 759 (citing 36 C.F.R § 219.19 (1995)).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 759 (internal citation omitted).
53. Id. at761.
54. Inland Empire at 763, n. 12 (citing 36 C.F.R. 219.19(a)(6)(1995)).
55. Id. at 762-63.
56. Id. at 763, n. 12.
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Either way, here as with the sensitive species claim, the Court blindly de-
ferred to the FS's choice of methodology without making an in depth in-
quiry into its reliability.
2. Idaho Sporting Congress v. Thomas
Idaho Sporting Congress v. Thomas represented an incremental change
in the Court's review of FS scientific methodology.57 In Thomas, plaintiff
conservation groups challenged two proposed timber sales in the Targhee
National Forest in Idaho ("TNF"). 58 One of Plaintiffs' claims was that the
FS failed to monitor trout populations, in violation of NFMA regulations
and the guidelines in the TNF's Forest Plan.59 Although the court recog-
nized that both NFMA and the TNF Forest Plan expressly provided for
population monitoring, it stated that the FS's decision to substitute the habi-
tat proxy method was an issue of scientific methodology. Citing Inland
Empire, the Court held that the habitat proxy method was not arbitrary and
capricious, and that it would defer to the FS's expertise. 60 Although it did
not undertake any kind of scrutiny of the FS's habitat as proxy method, it
did go a step further than the Inland Empire court. The Court stated that the
FS must address the adequacy of fish habitat and demonstrate that there
would be no appreciable habitat disturbance in the streams from the pro-
posed timber harvest.
61
In Thomas, Plaintiffs also brought a NEPA claim that the FS had failed
to take a "hard look" at the proposed timber sales' effects on water quality.62
On this claim, the Court refused to defer to the Forest Service's scientific
determination that the sales would have no significant effect on water qual-
ity because the determination relied upon unreliable incomplete scientific
methodology. 63 Unlike with the NFMA claim, on this claim the Court un-
dertook a more scrutinizing look at the FS's methodology. Specifically, the
Court asserted that in order to review the FS's decision, the scientific and
environmental hard data and methodologies underlying the FS expert's
opinion must be available to the public so that a plaintiff can challenge the
agency action, and a court may review that challenge, by analyzing the
methods and data itself, instead of being forced to simply second-guess the
agency.64
57. Idaho Sporting Cong. v. Thomas, 137 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 1998).
58. Id. at 1148.
59. Id. at 1153. In addition to providing substantive mandates, NFMA also sets forth procedural
requirements. Specifically, NFMA requires that the agency create a Land Resource Management Plan
for each National Forest. This Forest Plan guides specific on-the-ground activities by setting limitations
and scientific standards for those actions. See Lands Council, 395 F.3d at 1030-31; 16 U.S.C. §§
1604(a)(e).
60. Idaho Sporting at 1153-1154.
61. Id. at 1154.
62. Id. at 1150.
63. Id. at 1150-1151.
64. Id. at 1150.
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In its analysis, the Court first pointed out that the Forest Service's reli-
ance on a 1990 scientific study which only consisted of an expert opinion
based on the natural topography of the sale area - with no supporting hard
data - was inadequate to meet NEPA's requirements for the public disclo-
sure of underlying hard data.65 In response, the Forest Service pointed to a
1985 monitoring and sampling report - conducted in the general area by the
same scientist - to provide technical support for the scientific conclusion
that there would be no impact on water quality.66 The court found that al-
though the 1985 report did contain sampling of one of the affected creeks, it
did not cover a second affected creek, and the report itself cautioned against
being used to represent water quality for the whole area.67 Additionally, the
logging done before the 1985 report was significantly different than the
logging proposed for the sales at issue. The court concluded that the 1985
scientific report was unreliable as supporting data for the conclusion that
water quality would not be affected.68 Thus the court held that because the
FS had relied upon incomplete data and unreliable methodology, the Forest
Service had not complied with NEPA's requirement that the agency take a
"hard look" at environmental effects.
69
3. Idaho Sporting Congress v. Rittenhouse
Thomas represented a shift in the Court's willingness to scrutinize the
FS's methods more thoroughly, at least as to underlying data and methods
in the NEPA context.7 ° In Idaho Sporting Congress v. Rittenhouse the
Court demonstrated an even stronger willingness to thoroughly scrutinize
the FS's methods by expanding the scrutiny into the NFMA context.71 In
Rittenhouse, plaintiff conservation groups challenged two timber sales in
the Boise National Forest ("BNF") in Idaho. They argued that the BNF
violated NFMA by failing to ensure species viability.72 In this case, the
Court refused to defer to the FS's scientific determination that the viability
of old-growth and management indicator species was not threatened in the
Boise National Forest because the FS's determination was based on unreli-
able inaccurate scientific data.73 The court stated that the amount of old
growth habitat mandated by the BNF's Forest Plan was insufficient to main-
tain viability, and that even if it was sufficient, the FS had not ensured that
that amount existed. Undisputed evidence showed that none of the alleged
acres of old-growth habitat which had been designated by aerial photogra-
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Idaho Sporting at 1150.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Rittenhouse, 305 F.3d at 968.
72. Id. at 966.
73. Id. at 970-71.
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phy in "Management Area 35" actually existed upon ground verification
surveys of the areas. Forty percent of the old-growth habitat which had
been so designated had been lost to fire. Even some of the FS's own scien-
tists believed that the amount of old-growth habitat preserved by the Forest
Plan, and the FS's approach to sustaining old-growth dependent species'
viability, was invalid.74 Thus, because the FS had used incorrect data in its
old-growth habitat inventory the Court determined that the FS's habitat
proxy methodology was erroneous, unsound, arbitrary, and "so inaccurate"
that it failed to satisfy NFMA's substantive mandates to ensure wildlife
viability in the Forest.75
C. Current State of Law Governing Review of Scientific Methodology
One of the most recent Ninth Circuit cases to decide on issues of reliabil-
ity of FS scientific methodology is Earth Island Institute v. U.S. Forest
Service.76 Plaintiff conservation groups challenged two timber sales on the
El Dorado National Forest ("EDNF") in California. Under NEPA, Plain-
tiffs argued that the FS's scientific method of analyzing tree mortality was
unreliable, and therefore the FS was not ensuring scientific integrity nor
taking a "hard look" at environmental effects of the proposed sales. 77 Un-
der NFMA, Plaintiffs argued that the FS's population and habitat data on
three species was unreliable and inadequate to ensure viability.78 The Court
found for Plaintiffs on these and other related claims, and reversed the dis-
trict court's denial of a preliminary injunction for Plaintiffs because it found
that Plaintiffs had shown a "strong likelihood of success on the merits of
their case. 7 9 For both claims the Court scrutinized the underlying scientific
data and methodology, and based its decision on the integrity and reliability
of the FS's methodology.8 °
Regarding the NEPA claim, the Court undertook an in-depth analysis of
the scientific evidence provided by Plaintiffs expert and the FS scientist.
After a six page analysis on the merits of each scientific argument, the
Court held that even if the tree mortality model did not over predict mortal-
ity, the FS abused its discretion because it either misunderstood and misap-
plied the model, or understood the model's true meaning but concealed and
misrepresented it in the EIS. In either case the Court held that the FS's use
of the tree mortality model violated NEPA because it either failed to consti-
74. Rittenhouse at 967-970.
75. Id. at 972.
76. Earth Island Inst. 11, 442 F.3d at 1147.
77. Id. at 1152, 1161-1167.
78. Id. at 1152-53, 1174-1176.
79. Id. at 1153.
80. Id. at 1161-1167, 1174-1176.
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tute a "hard look," or put forward a misleading document in violation of the
mandate for scientific integrity.8 '
Regarding the NFMA claim, the Court reviewed the FS's underlying
habitat and population data to determine whether it was reliable. It found
that the EDNF's Forest Plan specifically required monitoring for two bird
species, but instead of monitoring the FS had unreasonably relied upon a
82generalized and weak bird survey, in violation of NFMA. Additionally,
the Court found that the FS's failure to monitor black-backed woodpeckers
populations and instead employ the habitat proxy method was a violation of
NFMA, because the habitat analysis was inadequate. Specifically the Court
found that there was no indication that the FS had consulted accurate or
current field studies, and the FS had not identified the methodology it used
to determine suitable habitat. The Court stated that FS methods must be
reasonably reliable and accurate, and here there was no factual basis regard-
ing quantity and quality of habitat that could satisfy NFMA.83
D. Need for Further Development of "Methodology Review" Rule
As the trend discussed above demonstrates, the Ninth Circuit seems to be
scrutinizing the FS's methodology more carefully under both NFMA and
NEPA claims. This trend fits squarely with the APA review standard
which requires a searching inquiry84 into whether the agency has "entirely
failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, '8 5 "offered an expla-
nation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the
agency,''86 committed a "clear error of judgment,, 87 and/or made findings
supported by substantial evidence, which in turn supported the agency's
decision. 88  But the Court has not yet articulated a clear test for how to
determine whether the FS's methodology is reliable. Instead, it simply ap-
plies a sort of common sense approach, which does now and will continue
to vary from panel to panel. The Court should proactively recognize that a
clear test for methodology review that may be applied in future cases would
ensure more consistency in judicial opinions in this area, as well as allow-
ing the judiciary to feel more comfortable in their role as arbiter of scien-
tifically-based disputes.
81. Id. at 1161-1168.
82. Id. at 1174-1176.
83. Id. at 1175-1176 (citing Native Ecosystems Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 428 F.3d 1233, 1250
(9th Cir. 2005); Ecology Ctr., 430 F.3d at 1068).
84. Marsh, 490 U.S. at 378.
85. Motor Veh. Mfrs., 463 U.S. at 43.
86. Id.
87. Marsh, 490 U.S. at 378.
88. Burlington Truck Lines, 83 S. Ct. at 245-246.
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III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Relevant Facts
Lands Council was a pivotal case in the development of the Ninth Cir-
cuit's trend toward methodology review. In Lands Council, Plaintiff con-
servation groups challenged the Iron Honey Project (the "Project") pro-
posed by the FS for the Idaho Panhandle National Forest ("IPNF") in Idaho.
Although the FS officially called the Project an "aquatic, vegetative and
wildlife habitat improvement" project, the Project was mostly a timber sale
that would produce 17.5 million board feet of timber.89 The project area
was located on 21,600 acres at the headwaters of the Little North Fork of
the Coeur D'Alene River, 30 miles upstream from the confluence of the
North and South Forks of the Coeur D'Alene Rivers, and 72 miles upstream
from Lake Coeur D'Alene. 90
Prior to the Project proposal, the FS had heavily logged the area. Within
the analysis area for the Project, the FS had previously allowed 3,750 acres
of clearcuts, 2,736 acres of overstory removal, 1,400 acres of commercial
thinning, 1,221 acres of salvage logging, and 1,063 acres of selective har-
vest.9' The FS had created an extensive road network to facilitate logging
which averaged 8.6 miles of road per square mile of land, and extensively
fragmented the remaining forest.92 As a result of the intensive timber har-
vest, water quality and aquatic species were imperiled. Of the 14 creeks in
the project area, four of the creeks were identified by the FS as non-
functioning, eight were identified by the FS as functioning at risk, and only
two were identified as properly functioning.93 Furthermore, the Bull Trout
was recognized as a threatened species under the Endangered Species Act
("ESA"), and the Westslope Cutthroat Trout was recognized by the FS as a
"species of concern," and both of these fish species were indicator species
for the management decisions of the FS of the IPNF.94
The Project proposed by the FS called for logging 1,408 more acres in
the area by the "shelterwood" logging method, which is similar to clearcut-
ting, but leaves a certain percentage of trees for shade to facilitate new
growth. The logging would provide 17.5 million board feet of timber, and
the Project would allow the reconstruction of 29 miles of road, the con-
struction of two miles of "temporary" road, and the construction of 0.2
miles of new road to facilitate logging.95
89. Appellant's Opening Br. at 5, Lands Council v. Powell, 395 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir. 2005).
90. Id. at 5, 8.
91. Id. at 9 (citing FEIS at 111-2).
92. Id. (citing FEIS F-2).
93. Id. (citing FEIS, App. D-3-10).
94. Id. at 11.
95. Id. at 10 (citing FEIS at AG-17; ROD-2).
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B. Procedural History
The FS began soliciting public comments on the project in 1996 as part
of the NEPA process known as "scoping." In April of 2000, the FS re-
leased the Draft EIS ("DEIS") for the Project, and Plaintiffs submitted
comments to the FS. In December 2001, the FS released the Final EIS
("FEIS") and in February 2002, the IPNF Supervisor signed the Record of
Decision ("ROD") for the Project. Plaintiffs filed an administrative appeal
of the Project with the Regional Forester and it was denied in May 2002.96
Plaintiffs filed suit in October 2002 against the FS and the Regional For-
ester in the United States District Court for the District of Montana, Mis-
soula Division, and the case was transferred to the District of Idaho. Both
parties moved for summary judgment and the district court granted sum-
mary judgment to the FS. Plaintiffs then appealed to the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals.97 The Court heard oral argument in March 2004, and
filed its original judgment in August 2004. The Court filed an amended
judgment, which made only minor corrections, in January 2005.98
C. Holding and Reasoning
The Ninth Circuit's decision reversed the district court's grant of sum-
mary judgment for the FS and held that the FS had violated both NFMA
and NEPA for various reasons. Among other claims, Plaintiffs argued that
the Project's impact on soils and species viability violated NFMA, and that
the EIS's water quality analysis and fish habitat analysis violated NEPA.
After analyzing FS methodology, the Court refused to defer to the FS's sci-
entific determinations regarding fish impact analysis, water quality analysis,
soil quality, and species viability because it found that the underlying scien-
tific data or methodology was unreliable.99
Regarding fish impact analysis, the Court found that the FS used West-
slope Cutthroat Trout habitat data which was too outdated to be accurate
and therefore could not be relied upon to make an accurate assessment of
the proposed project's impact on habitat and population of the Westslope
Cutthroat Trout in violation of NEPA's "hard look" requirement.'°° Regard-
ing water quality analysis, the Court found that the FS had used a flawed
scientific methodology in determining water quality effects because the
"WATSED" model that was used lacked important relevant variables, and
the Forest Service had failed to address its faults, in violation of NEPA.'0 '
The Court also addressed NFMA claims: the Court found that the scientific
96. Lands Council, 395 F.3d at 1025.
97. Id. at 1025-1026; Appellant's Opening Br. at 7.
98. Lands Council, 395 F.3d at 1019.
99. Id. at 1031-32, 1035, 1037.
100. Id. at 1031.
101. Id. at 1032.
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methodology the FS was using to inventory old growth habitat to ensure
species viability was unsound, and thus unreliable, because the FS's main
tool for old growth calculation was the timber stand management reporting
system database ("TSMRS"), which contained data that was too old, inac-
curate for canopy closure estimates, and insufficient for snag inventory.
These failures were not rehabilitated by "spot surveys" of actual popula-
tions on the ground, so the use of the data to support "proxy on proxy" spe-
cies viability analysis was unsound and in violation of NFMA.1
0 2
Perhaps most important was the Court's treatment of Plaintiffs' NFMA
soils claim. Like the other claims, the Court analyzed the underlying meth-
odology to determine whether it was reliable; but unlike ever before the
Court expressly articulated that the FS must demonstrate that its scientific
models meet a standard of "required reliability."'03 The FS had based its
soils determinations on a spreadsheet model which used aerial photographs
and soil samples taken throughout the forest (including in the activity area
for the Project) to predict soil quality in the proposed activity area units,
and those predictions were not verified with actual field monitoring.'14 The
Court refused to "trust the internal conclusions of the reliability of the
spreadsheet model when the Forest Service did not verify the predictions of
the spreadsheet model" because there was no way for the Court to know
whether the FS's predictions were "dead on or dead wrong."'05 The Court
held that under those circumstances, "the Forest Service's basic scientific
methodology, to be reliable, required that the hypothesis and prediction of
the model be verified with observation. '16 Because the predictions and
hypothesis were not verified, the methodology was unreliable, and thus the
Court held that the FS was not ensuring soil quality in violation of
NFMA. 1
07
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Correct Decision
The Court's implicit and explicit holding in Lands Council that the FS is
required to demonstrate the reliability of its scientific methodology was
correct. It is a proper interpretation of case precedent, regulatory mandates,
and the historical context of National Forest management. Additionally, the
correctness of the decision is further demonstrated by the manner in which
102. Id. at 1036-1037; see also Appellee's Br. at 42, Lands Council v. Powell, 395 F.3d 1019 (9th
Cir. 2005).
103. Lands Council, 395 F.3d at 1035.
104. Id. at 1034-35; see also Appellee's Br. at 49 n. 18.
105. Lands Council, 395 F.3d at 1035 (internal citations omitted).
106. Id.
107. Id.
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subsequent courts have embraced the concept of requiring the FS to use
reliable scientific methodology.
1. Consistency with Case Precedent
While expert discretion is vital to the administrative process, the U.S.
Supreme Court has refused to give unlimited discretion to agency experts.
In Burlington Truck Lines v. U.S., the Court stated that "unless we make the
requirements for administrative action strict and demanding, expertise, the
strength of modern government, can become a monster which rules with no
practical limits on its discretion.', 0 8 And in State of N.Y. v. U.S., the Su-
preme Court stated that "[a]bsolute discretion, like corruption, marks the
beginning of the end of liberty."' °9 The Ninth Circuit has accordingly ruled
that "[t]he deference accorded an agency's scientific or technical expertise
is not unlimited,"" thus even if an agency bases its decision on its own
scientific expertise, a court may refuse to defer to the agency expertise if
the decisions are not well reasoned."' Other courts have similarly held that
courts will not blindly defer to agency expertise,' 12 and that agencies may
not use "expertise as a cloak for fiat judgment."' 1 3 A reviewing court is not
invading the agency's expertise by refusing to accept the agency's pro-
nouncement without question."
4
Prior to Lands Council, courts in the Ninth Circuit had already recog-
nized that they were not bound to blindly accept an agency's scientific de-
terminations, and accordingly had determined that NFMA's substantive
mandates and NEPA's procedural mandates are violated when the agency
relies upon conclusions reached through unreliable scientific methodology.
Methodology which used incorrect data, incomplete data, or stale data had
been deemed to be unreliable." 5 Additionally, science based upon unveri-
fied data or models had also been deemed to be unreliable."
16
In Rittenhouse, the Ninth Circuit Court refused to defer to the FS's unre-
liable scientific determination that the viability of old-growth and manage-
ment indicator species was not threatened by proposed logging, because the
FS's determination was based on inaccurate scientific data, which had
108. Burlington Truck Lines v. U.S., 371 U.S. 156, 167 (1962) (internal citations omitted).
109. N.Y v. U.S., 342 U.S. 882, 884 (1951).
110. Nail. Wildlife Fedn. v. Natl. Marine Fisheries Serv., 422 F.3d 782, 798 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal
citations omitted).
111. Brower v. Evans, 257 F.3d 1058, 1067 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Defenders of Wildlife v. Babbit,
958 F. Supp. 670, 679 (D.D.C. 1997)).
112. N. Spotted Owl v. Hodel, 716 F. Supp. 479,482 (W.D. Wash. 1998).
113. TN Gas Pipeline Co. v. FERC, 926 F.2d 1206, 1211 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
114. U.S. v. F/V Alice Amanda, 987 F.2d 1078, 1087 (4th Cir. 1993).
115. See Rittenhouse, 305 F.3d at 967-972; Thomas, 137 F.3d at 1150-1151; Seattle Audubon Socy.
v. Espy, 998 F.2d 699, 703-704 (9th Cir. 1993) [hereinafter Seattle Audubon 11].
116. Kettle Range Conservation Group v. U.S. Forest Serv., 148 F. Supp. 2d 1107, 1125-1127 (E.D.
Wash. 2001).
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grossly misrepresented actual habitat conditions in the forest.' 1 7 In Thomas,
the Ninth Circuit Court refused to defer to the FS's unreliable scientific
determination that proposed logging would have no significant effect on
water quality, because the determination was based upon incomplete scien-
tific data that completely lacked important monitoring data." 8 Addition-
ally, to make the issue even clearer, Thomas further announced that the FS
may not simply rely on its expert opinion, without hard data, and it must
disclose the hard data relied upon by the FS to the public so that citizens
may properly challenge the action in court based on that underlying data,
and not simply based on second-guessing an agency's scientific conclu-
sions."19 In Seattle Audubon Society v. Espy the Ninth Circuit Court refused
to defer to the FS's unreliable scientific determination that the Interagency
Scientific Committee (ISC) conservation strategy for the Spotted Owl was
adequate to ensure viable populations of the Spotted Owl because the de-
termination relied upon stale scientific data, which had been superseded by
a more recent scientific study.' 20 In Kettle Range Conservation Group v.
U.S. Forest Service, a district court refused to defer to the FS's unreliable
scientific determination of soil conditions in the Colville National Forest
and Idaho Panhandle National Forest because the determination relied
upon unverified speculative scientific methodology and data, which did not
provide any actual accounting of real soil conditions in the forest.'
2
'
These cases demonstrate that prior to Lands Council, the Ninth Circuit
courts were already in the practice of overturning FS decisions that de-
pended upon unreliable scientific methodology. Lands Council simply con-
tinued this trend by requiring the FS to meet a standard of scientific reliabil-
ity before its scientific determinations would be judicially upheld. Specifi-
cally, Lands Council rejected inaccurate habitat modeling like in Ritten-
house, rejected incomplete data on water quality like in Thomas, rejected
stale scientific data like in Seattle Audubon Society, and rejected unverified
soil projections like in Kettle Range.'22
2. Consistency with Federal Regulation
In addition to the case precedent which preceded and cumulated in the
Lands Council decision, federal regulation supports the Court's holding.
NEPA's implementing regulations state that "[a]gencies shall insure the
professional integrity, including scientific integrity, of the discussions and
analyses in environmental impact statements. They shall identify any meth-
117. Rittenhouse, 305 F.3d at 968, 970-971.
118. Thomas, 137 F.3d at 1150-1151.
119. Id. at 1150.
120. 998 F.2d at 703-705.
121. 148 F. Supp at 1125-1127.
122. Lands Council, 395 F.3d at 1031-1032, 1035-1037; see also Lands Council v. Vaught, 198 F.
Supp. 2d 1211, 1239 (E.D. Wash. 2002) (also invalidating the FS's water quality model).
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odologies used and shall make explicit reference by footnote to the scien-
tific and other sources relied upon for conclusions in the statement."0
23
Lands Council's requirement for reliable scientific methodology fits
squarely with this regulation because if an agency is depending upon unre-
liable science for its conclusions, it cannot be said to be insuring "scientific
integrity."
3. Consistency with Historical Context
In addition to being grounded in case precedent and regulatory guidance,
the Lands Council decision was also grounded in historical context. As
discussed in Section II-A, Congress passed NFMA because the FS's previ-
ous exercises of discretion had resulted in the desecration of the National
Forests by over harvesting, which had in turn resulted in massive erosion
and flooding. Congress did not want the FS to have unlimited management
discretion any longer. Instead, Congress wanted the FS's discretion to be
reined in and guided by NFMA's implementing regulations, which had been
created by a specially appointed scientific committee.124 And Congress
expected that the remaining discretion that the FS retained would be exe-
cuted in light of contemporary scientific knowledge.
25
Although Congress passed statutes such as NEPA and NFMA to neutral-
ize the FS's institutional bias towards approving timber sales at the expense
of all other interests, courts recognize that the FS still retains that taint. In
the early 1990's the FS was repeatedly taken to court for its role in failing to
protect the Spotted Owl, and instead pandering to the timber industry. The
timber industry was infuriated when the courts held that all logging in Spot-
ted Owl habitat in the Pacific Northwest must be enjoined until the FS
could come up with a plan to avert the extinction of the Spotted Owl.1 26 At
an initial hearing on the controversy a FS research wildlife biologist con-
ceded that "there was a considerable - I would emphasize considerable -
amount of political pressure to create a plan which was an absolute mini-
mum. That is, which had a very low probability of success and which had a
minimum impact on timber harvest." ' Additionally, the team leader of the
FS research team, Dr. Jack Ward Thomas, also testified that "[a]fter the
initial release of the report [on owl habitat conservation], there was a politi-
cal decision made by the administration to appoint a cabinet-level review
team that would examine the report... with the idea of seeing if there was
some alternative course of action that would be less dramatic economically
123. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.24(2006).
124. Potter, supra n. 24, at 243-47.
125. Id. at 246.
126. Seattle Audubon Socy. v. Evans, 952 F.2d 297 (9th Cir. 1991); Seattle Audubon Socy. v. Evans,
771 F. Supp. at 1088-1096 (W.D. Wash. 1991) [hereinafter Seattle Audubon 1]; Seattle Audubon Socy. v.
Espy, 798 F. Supp. 1473 (W.D. Wash. 1992); Seattle Audubon I, 998 F.2d at 699.
127. Seattle Audubon 1, 771 F. Supp. at 1089.
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and socially."128 The court reviewing this testimony found that there was a
"deliberate and systematic refusal by the Forest Service and the FWS [Fish
and Wildlife Service] to comply with the laws protecting wildlife." 129
The Ninth Circuit has continued to recognize this institutional bias of the
FS. In one recent case, a concurring judge stated:
"I write separately to state my belief that the Forest Ser-
vice, because of its financial interest in the sale, may be
disqualified from approving the sale of timber from the El-
dorado [sic] Forest... A preliminary survey of the public in-
formation available on the budget of the Forest Service
suggests that timber sales by the Forest Service generate
many millions of dollars and that, to an extent not immedi-
ately determinable, the sales create a budget for the Forest
Service that, in the conduct of more sales, make it inde-
pendent of the normal appropriation process. Any govern-
mental agency would put a premium on an operation that
gives it a perpetual revolving fund not dependent on Con-
gress."130
In an even more recent case the majority opinion continued to recognize
the bias of the FS:
"We have noticed a disturbing trend in the USFS's recent
timber-harvesting and timber-sale activities... [citing
cases]... It has not escaped our notice that the USFS has a
substantial financial interest in the harvesting of timber in
the National Forest. We regret to say that in this case, like
the others just cited, the USFS appears to have been more
interested in harvesting timber than in complying with our
environmental laws." 13
Lands Council's refusal to blindly accept all scientific determinations
made by the FS is consistent with the NFMA Congress's mistrust of the
FS's management discretion, and judicial mistrust of the FS's impartiality.
And Lands Council's requirement that the FS use reliable scientific meth-
odology is consistent with the congressional intent behind NFMA that FS
management decisions be grounded in contemporary scientific knowledge,
and is one way to fairly counteract the FS's institutional bias toward ap-
proving logging at the expense of environmental considerations.
128. Id. at 1090.
129. Id.
130. Earth Island Inst. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 351 F.3d 1291, 1309-1310 (9th Cir. 2003) (Noonan, J.,
concurring) [hereinafter Earth Island 1].
131. Earth Island II, 442 F.3d at 1177.
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4. Acceptance by Subsequent Courts
In addition to being consistent with case precedent, regulatory guidance,
and historical context, the appropriateness of Lands Council's requirement
for reliable scientific methodology has been illustrated by its acceptance by
subsequent courts. In two recent key cases, the Ninth Circuit examined the
FS's underlying data and methods and found them to be too unreliable to
satisfy legal mandates.
As discussed above, the Ninth Circuit followed Lands Council in Earth
Island II, which was a case challenging logging in the El Dorado National
Forest. In that case the Court found that the FS had violated NEPA and
NFMA by using unreliable scientific data and methodology because (1) the
FS's habitat analysis was inadequate for the black-backed woodpecker, (2)
the FS's population monitoring data was too generalized for two other bird
species, and (3) the FS's tree mortality model was either incorrect, misap-
plied, or intentionally misleading. 
132
Another recent case which follows Lands Council is Ecology Center v.
Austin, which was a case challenging logging in the Lolo National Forest in
Montana. 133 In Ecology Center, the Ninth Circuit found that the FS had
violated NFMA and NEPA in part by using unreliable data and methodol-
ogy because it (1) relied upon an unverified scientific hypothesis that log-
ging in old-growth forest would restore old-growth habitat, and (2) assumed
that soil quality would be ensured without actually testing the soil condi-
tions in the activity units.134 Notably, the dissent in Ecology Center argued
that the holding of the case could not be "reconciled with [the] case law
requiring deference to an agency's technical expertise and experience."'
135
This dissenting opinion resulted in the timber industry publicly denouncing
Ecology Center as the "death of deference decision."'136 The timber industry
(who had intervened in the case) requested and was denied a rehearing en
banc in the Ninth Circuit. 37 The timber industry then petitioned for a writ
of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court, and was denied.
38
Several district courts in the Ninth Circuit have also required that the
FS's scientific methodology be reliable. In Native Ecosystems Council v.
Bosworth, the district court found that the FS had violated NFMA in its
approval of logging in the Targhee National Forest in Idaho because the FS
had depended upon an unreliable old-growth habitat inventory which was
132. Id. at 1166-1167, 1174-1176.
133. Ecology Ctr., 430 F.3d at 1057.
134. Id. at 1065, 1071.
135. Id. at 1077 (McKeown, J., dissenting) (internal quotations omitted).
136. John Q. Murray, Supreme Court to Vote Friday on Lolo Post-Bum Case, Clark Fork Chronicle
(Jan. 4, 2007) (internal quotations omitted).
137. See Appellant's Pet. for Writ of Cert. at viii, Mineral County, Mont. v. Ecology Ctr., Inc., 127
S. Ct. 931 (2006).
138. Mineral County, Mont. v. Ecology Ctr., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 931 (2007), cert. denied.
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based upon inaccurate and unverified scientific data.' 39 In Environmental
Protection Information Center v. Blackwell, the district court found that the
FS had violated NFMA in its approval of logging in the Mendocino Na-
tional Forest in California because the FS had depended upon an unreliable
habitat model which had not been verified with a comparison to monitoring
data which reflected current conditions.1 40 In Idaho Conservation League
v. Bennett, the district court found that the FS had violated NEPA in its
approval of logging on National Forest and Bureau of Land Management
lands in central Idaho because the FS had depended upon an unreliable de-
termination of existing fish habitat conditions which did not quantify or
analyze key variables.'
4 1
In the above mentioned cases, the courts conducted an in-depth inquiry
into whether the FS had utilized reliable scientific methodology in its deci-
sions to allow logging projects to proceed. This acceptance of Lands
Council's pronouncement that the FS must use reliable scientific methodol-
ogy demonstrates that the Court's announcement of that rule was correct.
B. Standard for Reliability
While the Court in Lands Council did correctly state that the FS must
demonstrate the reliability of its scientific methodology, it left future courts
without an articulated standard by which to measure whether methodology
is in fact reliable. Because of the court's recent history giving the FS blind
deference, it is understandable that some judges might be confused and
uncomfortable applying the required reliability rule. For example, the
Ecology Center dissent claimed that the majority decision "represents an
unprecedented incursion into the administrative process and ratchets up the
scrutiny we apply to the scientific and administrative judgments of the For-
est Service" and that the majority was engaging in "flyspeck[ing] the
agency's analysis."'' 42 The dissent's position, though refuted by case prece-
dent, congressional intent, and historical context, as noted above, is under-
standable in light of the historical judicial hesitancy to adequately review
FS decisions.
The articulation of a clear standard for methodology review would be
helpful for future courts to have a consistent understanding of the law and
to issue consistent opinions. One acceptable standard would be one that is
based upon the scientific expert reliability test articulated in Daubert v.
Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals and Federal Rule of Evidence 702.141 In
139. Native Ecosystems Council v. Bosworth, 2005 WL 2387594 (D. Idaho 2005).
140. Envtl. Protec. Info. Ctr. v. Blackwell, 389 F. Supp. 2d 1174, 1213-1214 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
141. Idaho Conserv. League v. Bennett, 2005 WL 1041396, 10 (D. Idaho 2005).
142. Ecology Ctr., 430 F.3d at 1072, 1077 (McKeown, J., dissenting).
143. Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). For a more exhaustive discussion on the
applicability of Daubert standards to Forest Service science, see Erin Madden, Seeing the Science for
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Daubert, the U.S. Supreme Court announced that it was confident that fed-
eral judges were competent enough to review scientific testimony and de-
termine whether it was reliable enough to be admitted as evidence in
trial.' 44 Upon examination of the language of Federal Rule of Evidence 702
-- which explicitly allowed expert testimony when based upon "scientific
knowledge" -- the Court found that "[t]he adjective 'scientific' implies a
grounding in the methods and procedures of science. Similarly, the word
'knowledge' connotes more than subjective belief or unsupported specula-
tion." 145 Thus the Court held that before a judge should allow expert scien-
tific testimony in a trial, the judge should first determine whether "the rea-
soning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid
and... whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to
the facts in issue.
'
,
146
Further, the Daubert Court outlined various factors that a judge could
consider when determining whether a scientific methodology is reliable
evidence: whether the methodology can and has been tested to see if it can
be falsified, whether the methodology has been subjected to peer review
and publication, what the known or potential rate of error is for the method-
ology, and whether the methodology had been generally accepted. 147 Post
Daubert, courts adopted additional factors to consider: whether the testi-
mony was specifically created for litigation, whether extrapolation was un-
justified, whether the expert has accounted for obvious alternative explana-
tions, whether the expert's work meets her own professional intellectual
standards, and whether the expert's field is a reliable one.' 48 Additionally
post-Daubert, Rule 702 was amended to reflect the Daubert decision, and
now requires that in order for a scientific expert to testify the court must
first determine that "(1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data,
(2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3)
the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of
the case."
' 149
Because the FS is required by NEPA regulations to ensure the scientific
integrity of its methodology, and because the Ninth Circuit already conducts
reviews of FS scientific methodology to determine whether it is reliable, a
standard for FS methodology review which incorporates Rule 702 and the
the Trees: Employing Daubert Standards to Assess the Adequacy of National Forest Management Un-
der the National Forest Management Act, 18 J. Envtl. L. & Utig. 321 (2003).
144. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593.
145. Id. at 590.
146. Id. at 592-594.
147. Id. at 593-594.
148. F. R. Evid. 702 (citing Daubert, 43 F.3d at 1317; General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U'S. 136,
146 (1997); Claar v. Burlington N. R.R., 29 F.3d 499 (9th Cir. 1994); Sheehan v. Daily Racing Form,
Inc., 104 F.3d 940, 942 (7th Cir. 1997); Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 149-154 (1999);
Moore v. Ashland Chem., Inc., 151 F.3d 269 (5th Cir. 1998); Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d
1188 (6th Cir. 1988)).
149. F. R. Evid. 702.
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Daubert factors would work well here.150 Upon presentation of complaints
that the FS's science is unreliable, the reviewing court should first deter-
mine whether the FS's conclusions and methods are based upon sufficient
data. Then the court should determine whether the methodology used by
the FS is reliable and was reliably applied to the data. In order to determine
whether the methods and application were reliable, the courts should use
Daubert factors such as whether the methodology has been tested and not
falsified through testing, whether extrapolation was unjustified, whether the
expert accounted for obvious alternative explanations, whether the conclu-
sions were specifically created for litigation, etc. This procedure would
result in a more consistent and appropriate body of law that restrains the
absolute discretion of the FS, and ensures that the FS is applying valid sci-
entific methodologies in its management of the National Forests.
V. CONCLUSION
The Lands Council Court's holding which requires that FS scientific
methodology be reliable was a correct restatement of case precedent, fed-
eral regulation, and the historical context surrounding National Forest man-
agement, and the holding has been embraced by subsequent courts, but the
Court should have articulated a clear test for future courts to utilize when
determining whether FS science is reliable. A clear standard would rein-
force the requirement for scientific reliability, and allow courts to consis-
tently continue the trend of thorough scrutiny that the public and Congress
want them to engage in when reviewing FS management decisions. Chang-
ing times have brought changing demands from a public citizenry that is
increasingly aware of the FS's mismanagement of their National Forests. In
light of these demands, the courts can no longer allow the FS to hide behind
an incantation that the courts must defer to an agency's scientific decisions.
As the Supreme Court in Daubert stated regarding review of the validity of
scientific methodology: "[w]e are confident that federal judges possess the
capacity to undertake this review." 151 Not only is the federal judiciary
competent to do this type of review, but in the context of National Forest
management, federal environmental laws and the public interest mandate
that they do so.
150. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.24 (2006).
151. Daubert, 590 U.S. at 593.
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